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Abstract This paper examines patterns of reported cargo thefts involving violence in
the Europe, Middle East, and Africa region with regard to the value of stolen goods,
incident frequency, transport chain location, and incident category. The research meth-
od is deductive and is based on analyses of secondary data obtained from the Incident
Information Service by the Transported Asset Protection Association. The results are
discussed within a frame of reference based on supply chain risk management and
supply chain disruption literature. We found that perpetrators who use violence seem to
cause greater losses per theft than those who use other types of modus operandi.
Further, the most common type of violent cargo theft occurs on Mondays in January
when cargo vehicles are robbed on the road and consumer electronics are stolen. In
terms of supply chain disruption, violent cargo thefts can be seen as externally-caused
disruptions, which can indirectly cause major problems for the supply chain.
Keywords Hijack . Robbery . Transport chain . Violence in cargo theft . Supply chain
disruption
Introduction
There are two main features of a hijacking of goods transported by road, namely
violence and timing. According to an example from the French Police (OCLDI), the
following is a typical hijacking: Once the truck or van has been forced into stopping (by
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a car or a van blocking the road), the drivers are pulled out of the vehicle and very often
taken hostage or even physically assaulted. The hijacked truck or van is then driven by
the perpetrators to a nearby hiding place where another truck or van is waiting, and the
products are immediately unloaded onto the truck or van. Normally, the stolen truck or
van is then set on fire, and the hijacked drivers are released shortly thereafter in remote
locations (FWI SCIC 2015).
According to van Marle (2015), violent cargo crimes are on the rise in Europe,
especially in France, Italy, and Russia. Furthermore, FreightWatch reports that of the
top ten freight crime hotspots in Europe, seven will see an increase in violent thefts and
hijackings in the future (van Marle 2015). Cargo thefts in the greater Paris area are a
good example as these crimes are three times more likely to involve violence as
compared to cargo thefts in other parts of France. Another key component is that the
attack normally happens within just a few kilometers of the consignor or consignee’s
terminal (van Marle 2015). This type of hot spot is normally referred to as Baround the
corner^ (cf Ekwall and Lantz 2016).
Both of these descriptions of violent cargo thefts signal a few interesting features.
First, potential perpetrators have determined during the planning stages of certain cargo
thefts to use violence. Second, there are differences across Europe in terms of how
violence is used and in terms of transport chain locations, including where the shipment
is targeted.
In addition to the direct effect of cargo loss as a result of such thefts, there is a
disruptive effect due to the violent modus operandi. For example, in September 2014,
following several violent thefts on delivery vehicles within a short period, a logistics
service provider (LSP) invoked a force majeure clause in accordance with liability
regulations (Karlsson 2014). This led to all scheduled deliveries within a certain
geographical area in Stockholm being temporarily stopped and delayed for a few days.
Thus, violent thefts against delivery vehicles cause a geographically-linked supply
chain disruption.
This paper will address two of the three aforementioned features, namely the use of
violence in relation to the value of stolen products in cargo theft incidents. The third
issue, which relates to insurance policies and regulations and the role of insurance
providers, will only be addressed in this paper in the context of violent theft.
According to Ekwall and Lantz (2013), cargo theft is a crime generally characterized
by seasonal effects. These effects may be related to calendar elements like time-of-year,
time-of-week, and even time-of-day. Such effects imply a non-constant theft endanger-
ment over the year, month, or day. For example, business representatives often talk
about the BChristmas rush^ in cargo theft, referring to an increase in thefts linked to
Christmas sales (Ekwall and Lantz 2013). The loss of a truck loaded with expensive
consumer electronics a few weeks before Christmas can, of course, have a substantial
impact on the regional market. However, there is no prior research on seasonal patterns
in violent thefts. Hence, the main research question in this study is: Are violent cargo
crimes characterized by seasonal effects?
Research purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore patterns of reported cargo thefts involving
violence in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region with respect to the
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value of stolen goods, incident frequency, transport chain location, incident category,
and modi operandi (MO). The study’s results have implications for researchers and
practitioners as cargo theft incidents lead to a disruption in the flow of goods.
Background
The theft of goods poses a significant problem across the globe. Cargo theft represents
a value that the European Union (EU) estimates as €8.2 billion annually. In the context
of all cargo transportation, this is an average of €6.72 per trip. However, these figures
are conservative because most cargo thefts go unreported and because the figures
reflect only the value of the items stolen. Further, collecting accurate data for cargo
theft losses is either difficult or impossible in many cases because of limited reporting
by the transportation industry and the lack of an international law enforcement system
that could ensure consistency in reporting and tracking (ECMT 2001).
In addition, the insurance business faces difficulties distinguishing fraud from actual
theft; but even if it had the correct figures for theft, it would not share these with the
public due to concerns over trade secrets and competition. Moreover, despite the
aforementioned figures, general cargo theft is regarded as low priority in most countries
and is often largely perceived as a cost of doing business (EU 2003). Nevertheless,
research shows that cargo theft poses a serious threat to modern trade (EP 2007). The
reporting of violent cargo theft would, from a theoretical perspective, represent most of
the actual incidents because this type of modus operandi involves someone being
threatened or even killed, a situation which leads to a greater willingness to report
and to more attention from authorities. Therefore, the official statistics for this type of
theft are likely to be more accurate. However, the problem with insurance fraud
remains, even if it is arguably more difficult to stage such a fraud than an actual theft.
General statistics on cargo theft provide that about 41% of all incidents occur during
the driving phase of transportation and involve threats against the driver or tearing the
canvas of the load unit. In 15% of incidents, the vehicle is stolen along with the goods.
Another 15% represents hijackings and robberies (EP 2007). According to a report by
the International Road Transport Union (IRU) (2008), vehicles and their loads were
targeted in 63% of all thefts, while 43% were either direct thefts of transported goods or
included theft of the drivers’ personal belongings. Of these thefts, 42% occurred in
vehicle parks and 19% on motorways (IRU 2008). This means that 61% of all thefts
occurred at a temporary stopping place along a road. The targets of cargo theft are
typically vehicles that are temporarily parked along the roadside, often waiting for
loading and unloading opportunities (EP 2007; TruckPol 2007; IRU 2008). In this
context, prior research has shown that a violent MO has a greater impact (in terms of
the higher value of the stolen goods) than average (Ekwall and Lantz 2013; Ekwall and
Lantz 2015a; Ekwall and Lantz 2015b).
This paper focuses on the use of violence from the perpetrator’s perspective, and the
aforementioned elements will serve as the basis for understanding crime. In criminol-
ogy, violent crimes are crimes in which the perpetrator uses or threatens force against a
victim. Depending on local legislation, violent crimes can be anything from murder to
robbery, even harassment. A violent crime may include the use of a weapon, although
this is not required. Comparing statistics and knowledge about violent crimes is
difficult because different legislation and practices means that the interpretation of
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figures and facts is inconsistent. Normally, the homicide index (the number of homi-
cides per 100,000 citizens annually) is used as a good indicator of the general danger in
a region or country. In most EU countries, this index is between one and two (UN-CTS
2010), and this is considered a moderate or even low index number. The general crime
trend in the EU is that crime is declining from its peak in 1995. However, according to
Tavares and Thomas (2009), there was an increase in reported types of violent crime
(up 3%) and drug trafficking and robbery (both up 1%) during 1998–2007. During the
same period, there has been a decrease in motor vehicle theft (down 7%) and domestic
burglary (down 3%). There seems to be a time difference among countries; however,
the overall trend is nevertheless declining, and crime patterns are surprisingly similar
among member states (van Dijk et al. 2006). In sum, the general EU trend for violent
crime is slightly increasing, although murder is slightly decreasing.
According to the IRU (2008), 17% of all cargo vehicle drivers have been robbed in
the past five years, and 30% of the robbed drivers have experienced more than one
theft. Further, 21% of the robbed drivers reported that they were physically assaulted
(IRU 2008). In addition, 10% of all freight crimes are hijackings (IRU 2008). These
statistics illustrate the presence of violent crimes for road transportation within the EU.
According to Ekwall and Lantz (2013), the majority of cargo thefts are low impact
because the perpetrators steal goods of relatively small value. In addition, the majority
of the thefts occur away from transportation facilities in places such as non-secured
parking, secured parking, and en route. These account for 78% of all incidents, yet
only 57% of the loss value (Ekwall and Lantz 2013). This could indicate that potential
perpetrators consider the security at facilities to be generally higher than the security in
areas outside of such facilities. Thus, if potential perpetrators steal goods from facilities,
they need to make better plans or be prepared to use another MO, such as violence, in
order to succeed.
A violent MO is not unusual among thieves in retail stores either. Inventory loss due
to criminal behavior in retail stores is estimated to be more than 24 billion Euros
annually (Bamfield 2004). According to BRC (2009) violent attacks against retails
stores in the UK cost (losses plus prevention) 2.4 billion pounds annually. Furthermore,
the cost itself is not the only problem, as violent attacks against retail staff doubled
between 1996 and 2001 (Lawrence 2004). The typical perpetrator is described as a drug
abuser stealing between £22,000 and £44,000 annually (ibid). Similar to theft of goods
during transport, a relatively small number of thefts causes the majority of losses while
the majority of thefts corresponds with relatively low loss values (Bamfield 2006).
From the perpetrators’ perspective, the value of stolen goods needs to be higher in
order to cover the extra risk. According to Saunders (2008), it is possible that Bsome
perpetrators respond to sophisticated transport security measures by increasing their use
of unsophisticated and brutal violence against drivers and terminal personnel.^ A
similar development was expressed by European Parliament (2007): BThe criminal
organisations seem to react to the increase of security with more aggressive methods.^
In other words, violence can be used to steal more goods (of a greater total value)
during any individual theft or used as a way to overcome security features.
In order to provide a better understanding of the use of violence in cargo theft, this
paper uses criminological theories in combination with logistics theories and actual data
about cargo theft from the Incident Information Service (IIS) of the Transported Asset
Protection Association (TAPA) in the EMEA. Therefore, an interdisciplinary approach
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to views, ideas, and theories is employed, as required when developing applied science
research (Stock 1997).
Frame of reference
Research in supply chain risk management (SCRM) is receiving an increasing amount
of interest from practitioners and scholars. Colicchia and Strozzi (2012) propose a
comprehensive risk management and mitigation model for global supply chains, while
Manuj and Mentzer (2008) argue that the risk of any particular type of loss should be
conceptualized as the probability of the loss multiplied by its impact. Similar definitions
of risk can be found in most contemporary research on SCRM (Norrman and Jansson
2004; Khan and Burnes 2007; Wagner and Bode 2008; Tummala and Schoenherr 2011,
Ghadge et al. 2013). Thus, from this perspective, risk should be considered as a
combination of the probability or frequency of a certain hazard’s occurrence and the
value or impact of its occurrence. In this paper, we use the reported occurrence of a
violent modus operandi for cargo theft, together with the reported impact.
Supply chain disruption
In any supply chain setup, there can be a wide variety of disruptive events, such as
transportation delays, port stoppages, accidents and natural disasters, poor communi-
cation, part shortages, quality issues, and operational issues (Chapman et al. 2002;
Machalaba and Kim 2002; Mitroff and Alpasan 2003; Ghadge et al. 2013). The key
issue is that if one link in the chain fails to fulfill its intended purposes, the entire chain
will fail (Rice and Caniato 2003). Furthermore, the disruptive event has the potential to
be passed onto another tier in the chain, with potential amplification effects. The real
danger is not found in long-term changes like customer demand – although that may
threaten the company’s existence – but rather, it is found in random fluctuations that
can affect large parts of a certain supply chain causing major management problems.
Interestingly, there has been relatively little research within the area of SCM to
understand disruptions of supply chains.
According Mitroff and Alpasan (2003), only 5–25% of the largest companies have
plans to handle crises or disruptions. Furthermore, according to Riddalls and Bennett
(2002), disruptions can be costly in supply chains, such as long lead-times, stock-outs,
and more importantly, inability to meet customer demand. Levy (1995) states that
disruptions can lead to unexpected costs when shipping lead-times are long. More
importantly, Levy (1995) found that managers address crises as one-time events instead
of considering the lack of robustness in their own supply chain. One of the biggest
research problems in this area is the lack of cost estimations for supply chain disrup-
tions. Only a few attempts have been made to estimate these costs, and Rice and
Caniato (2003) estimate a daily cost for disruptions as 50–100 million US dollars.
According to Wu et al. (2007), uncertainty is the key issue in supply chain
disruptions as disruptions are caused by unexpected events. These events can be
uncertain in many different ways, but they all negatively affect the flow of goods
through the supply chain. The sources of these unexpected events may be poor quality
(in general), failing supply due to new import/export regulations, and criminal
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activities. Uncertainty in supply chains is a well-researched topic. According to Wild-
ing (1998), uncertainty is generated within the supply chain as a result of the design and
operation of the system instead of external sources. Similar approaches to uncertainty
can be found in most contemporary research (Van der Vorst and Beulens 2002; Vidal
and Goetschalckx 2000; Muralidharan et al. 2001; Ghadge et al. 2013; Lee and Rha
2016), which indicates that uncertainty is primarily addressed or reduced through safety
buffers in time, capacity, and inventory. One interesting view on SCD is that under-
standing managerial behavior in SCD scenarios and the managerial decision-making
process is important for understanding the long-term impact of an SCD (Lorentz and
Hilmola 2012). The general strategy with SCD is to better manage the supply chain
system to handle disruption risks, while still having the traditional logistics/SCM
advantage of low costs and inventory levels and greater flexibility and agility, and also
having the ability to reduce amplifications of bullwhips or domino effects throughout
the chain (Wu et al. 2007; Lorentz and Hilmola 2012).
In most papers discussing SCD, the external unexpected event of violent cargo theft
is not even mentioned. To be clear, crime in general is not really addressed as a source
of disruption, even though billions are lost annually due to criminal attacks towards the
international flow of goods (EU 2003; EP 2007). This paper uses a risk management
approach within SCD to understand the loss of goods due to violent attacks in order to
reduce the gap in the current research.
Crime seasonality
Criminology research posits that crime is a somewhat seasonal phenomenon. Cohen
(1941) argues that there are two types of seasonality at the local level: (1) crimes
against property (burglaries, robberies, and thefts), and (2) crimes of aggression
(assaults, homicides, and rapes). These two general theories on seasonality have
emerged from prior research: the temperature aggression hypothesis and the needs-
based view of property crime (Falk 1952). The latter suggests that seasonal unemploy-
ment and living expenses influence the level of criminal activity at different times of the
year (Gorr et al. 2003); thus, non-violent crimes are more frequent during the autumn
and winter, and violent crimes (such as hijacking and robbery) are more common
during the summer.
The temperature aggression hypothesis (i.e., that hot temperatures cause an increase
in aggressive and violent crimes) has been supported by laboratory and field experi-
ments, correlational studies, and archival studies of violent crimes (Anderson et al.
2000). In terms of seasonality, studies that compare regional violence rates all support
the conclusion that hot years, seasons, months, and days contribute to the use of
violence in crimes (Anderson et al. 1997). According to Anderson et al. (1997), even
global warming can lead to an increase in the violence used in crimes. In this paper, we
only address the temperature aggression hypothesis because we focus on violent cargo
theft. In other words, we consider whether there is seasonal variation (an increase
during the summer) for a violent modus operandi (hijacking and robbery).
According to Hylleberg (1995), the exogenous causes of crime, namely calendar
events, weather, and time of year, are important for understanding seasonality because
they can lead to an increase or decrease in criminal behavior depending on local
contextual circumstances. The time of year (e.g., during the Christmas shopping
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season) can influence criminal opportunities in various ways (Gorr et al. 2003).
Consequently, the seasonality of crimes can be influenced by the time of year depend-
ing on the number of targets available and the potential customers for stolen goods. For
similar reasons, seasonality can also be linked to calendar events such as the day of the
week. However, in this case, seasonality largely depends on the number of available
targets. Nevertheless, such seasonality of crimes aids crime forecasting (Gorr et al.
2003) and the use of security measures as a proactive response to an expected increase
in crime.
Hypotheses
Based on the literature review, our overall supposition is that there are seasonal patterns
in the use of violence in cargo theft. This supposition can be broken down into four
testable hypotheses, which are listed below:
H1: Incident values for violent cargo theft differ across months.
H2: Incident frequencies for violent cargo theft differ across months.
H3: Incident values for violent cargo theft differ across days of the week.
H4: Incident frequencies for violent cargo theft differ across days of the week.
Method
The TAPA EMEA IIS database
The TAPA EMEA IIS database, which was analyzed in this paper, comprises approx-
imately 20,000 individual reported incidents of road transportation crimes committed
between 2000 and 2011 within the EMEA area. The crime statistics in the TAPA
EMEA IIS database are prepared by TAPA members and various law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) in the EU. The identities of the companies involved, directly and
indirectly, are not disclosed in the reports in order to avoid negative publicity and
ensure better data reliability. Further, the reporting entity determines the extent of
disclosure of the incident details, thus suggesting that the quality of data varies across
incidents and countries. Nevertheless, the TAPA EMEA IIS database is considered the
most accurate database in the EU for crime incidents (Europol 2009). The reporting
procedure ensures that the database presents a true picture of cargo theft incidents in
terms of absolute numbers and trends. The global TAPA structure enables the data to be
limited to the EMEA region because there are three TAPA regions (the Americas,
EMEA, and Asia-Pacific), each of which has its own IIS database. Within the EMEA
region, the vast majority of the data is for countries in Northern and Western Europe.
Consequently, the data cover the same seasonality (time of year); that is, the seasons of
the northern hemisphere.
Reports for the database are generally created using the online reporting interface at
www.tapaemea.com. The reports include a number of mandatory facts such as the
reporting person (name with contact details), incident date, and description. Further,
there are a number of fixed descriptions about the incident in the following categories:
incident type, modus operandi, type of location, country of occurrence, and product and
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loss value in euros. It is also possible to add more data to the report. This paper uses the
data in the fixed description fields for violence related to cargo theft.
Research method
Risk is a concept related to the future. Past events, by definition, are not risky because
there is certainty about what has already happened. However, historical data can often
be used to analyze future risks related to past specific events. Therefore, in this paper,
we use historical incident frequencies to estimate the probability of future incidents, and
historical incident values to estimate the impact of future incidents. We have only used
secondary data and in this regard we follow the reasoning of Rabinovich and Cheon
(2011). They argue that the importance of secondary data analysis has been overlooked
in logistics research and that it should be used to address the contemporary challenges
in logistics and supply chain research.
The use of secondary data in this paper provides high internal validity and a good
opportunity to replicate this study (Rabinovich and Cheon 2011). The paper follows the
tradition of logistics research by using a systematic approach to understand the problem
from a holistic perspective while focusing on the interactions among components rather
than the causes (Aastrup and Halldórsson 2008). We describe and analyze the values
and frequencies of incidents using relevant statistics. The analyses are based on the
logarithm of the incident value after standardizing for the length of the month. Further,
in order to compare the mean values, we use a one-way ANOVA when the Levene’s
test does not reveal significant heteroscedasticity and the Brown-Forsythe test when it
does. If either the ANOVA or Brown-Forsythe test is rejected, a post-hoc analysis is
conducted using pairwise t-tests with the Bonferroni correction or Tamhane’s T2. The
frequencies among the various groups are compared using the chi-square test. If the test
is rejected, a post-hoc analysis is conducted using pairwise chi-square tests with the
Bonferroni correction.
When the data are closer to a census than to a random sample, the results of regular
significance tests are less valuable because the observed parameters coincide with the
actual population parameters in a true census. Because our data are drawn from a
census of incidents reported between 2000 and 2011, our descriptive statistics can be
considered as actual population parameters. However, because we use this data to study
the future of transportation security, the data should be considered as a consecutive
sample and hence be subject to significance testing.
Incident categories for cargo theft
Typology of road cargo theft incidents
The definition of road cargo theft used in this paper is the same as that used by the TAPA
EMEA IIS database and by the European Police Office (Europol) (2009): any theft of a
shipment during road transportation or within a warehouse, but excluding internal petty
theft. Further, the incident category definitions (Europol 2009) are as follows:
& Hijacking: force, violence, or threat is used against the driver, and the vehicle and/
or goods are stolen. Hijacking includes forcibly stopping a vehicle.
10 D. Ekwall, B. Lantz
& Robbery: force, violence, or threat is used against individuals, and the vehicle and/
or goods are stolen. Robbery does not include forcibly stopping a vehicle.
& Theft: goods are stolen.
& Theft of: an unattended vehicle and/or trailer are stolen along with their loads.
& Lorry theft: a lorry (a vehicle carrying cargo) is stolen but not its cargo.
& Theft from vehicles: theft of loads from stationary vehicles (e.g., by curtain
slashing) or from delivery vehicles left unlocked/unattended, or theft from a
facility.
& Deception/Diversion: drivers or companies are deceived into delivering to a
destination other than the one intended (commonly referred to as Baround the
corner^); this includes Be-crimes^ whereby bogus logistics companies are
established to divert deliveries.
& Fraud: individuals are intentionally deceived and a vehicle and/or goods are stolen.
& Burglary: burglary in commercial premises that are part of the supply chain in all
of the above cases.
The MO categories are listed below:
& Deception: drivers or companies are deceived into delivering to a destination
other than the one intended (commonly referred to as Baround the corner^); this
includes Be-crimes^ whereby bogus logistics companies are established to divert
deliveries.
& Deceptive stop: a deceptive method is used to stop a vehicle without the use of
violence or force.
& Forced stop: force, violence, or threats are used against a driver, and the vehicle or
goods are stolen. Hijacking is a form of forced stop.
& Internal: thefts are committed by employees belonging to either the logistics
companies or one of the players in the supply chain.
& Intrusion: incidents where perpetrators Bbreak^ their way to the goods. Burglary is
a form of intrusion.
& Pilferage: a theft wherein the value or the quantity of the stolen goods is low.
& Violent: incidents where force, violence, or threats are used against a driver or
terminal workers, and the vehicle or goods are stolen. Robbery is considered a
violent crime.
This paper uses the following six categories for transport chain location (consistent
with how data are stored in the TAPA EMEA IIS database):
& Non-secured parking: the theft occurs in a non-secured parking area.
& Secured parking: the theft occurs in a secured parking area.
& Third-party facility: the theft occurs at a third-party facility or warehouse.
& En route: the theft occurs when the vehicle is moving. This may include a forced
stop.
& Transport mode facility: the theft occurs on a specific mode of transport (aviation,
maritime, road, rail) or at a specific facility or terminal.
& Supply chain facility: the theft occurs at either a consignor’s or a consignee’s
facility (the owner of a goods facility).
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In this paper, we focus on violent cargo crimes. This means that the data used from
the TAPA EMEA IIS database is either from the Bviolent^ MO or the incident
categories of Brobbery^ and Bhijacking.^
Results
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of all reported thefts within the TAPA
EMEA IIS database for 2000–2011. As expected, there are large differences
between the years. For example, there are significantly larger numbers of reports
for 2006–2010. This suggests that any single year of statistics is not representative
of the cargo theft problem. The large differences could indicate a similarly large
difference in the hidden statistics of cargo theft reports. In addition, according to the
IRU (2008), 30% of drivers did not report thefts to the police. This percentage
figure is supported by the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT)
(2001) and other reports in the field. However, despite this, the data in Table 1 show
that violence is a less frequent problem, although it is involved in 2–19% of all
thefts with a mean of around 5–6%. In this context, it is important to remember that
the hidden statistics should reflect fewer violent crimes because the methods used
generally require eyewitnesses to violence and threats. There is insignificant sup-
port for this claim in Table 1 because as the annual total of reported thefts increases,
the relative share of violent thefts decreases.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for different months. As expected, there are
large differences between the months. Hence, a more comprehensive analysis is
needed. A Levene test reveals significant heteroscedasticity in the mean incident values
(L = 3.7002, p < 0.001). Thus, a Brown-Forsythe test is used to compare the mean
values across months, but no significant difference is found (F = 1.216, p = 0.277).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of reported thefts for 2000–2011 in the TAPA EMEA IIS database
Year Total number
of reported thefts
Total number of violent thefts
(robbery, hijacking, and/or violent)
Percentage share of violent thefts
(robbery, hijacking, and/or violent)
2000 131 22 16.80
2001 118 16 13.60
2002 236 35 14.80
2003 376 62 16.50
2004 447 85 19.00
2005 408 77 18.90
2006 874 78 8.90
2007 3963 246 6.20
2008 4471 205 4.60
2009 5087 219 4.30
2010 3179 67 2.10
2011 214 19 8.90
Total 19,504 1131 5.80
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Pairwise chi square tests with Bonferroni correction reveal that incident frequency is
significantly higher in January than in June and July.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for different days of the week. As expected,
there are large differences between the days. Hence, a more comprehensive analysis is
needed. A Levene test reveals significant heteroscedasticity in the mean incident values
(L = 6.661, p < 0.001). A Brown-Forsythe test reveals that different days of the week
are characterized by significantly different mean incident values (F = 2.592, p = 0.018).
Post-hoc analysis using pairwise t-tests with Bonferroni correction reveals that Monday
has a significantly higher incident value than Tuesday. Finally, pairwise chi square tests
with Bonferroni correction reveal that incident frequency is significantly lower on
Saturdays and Sundays than on other days of the week.
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics for different transport chain locations.1 As
expected, there are large differences between the locations. Hence, a more compre-
hensive analysis is needed. A Levene test reveals significant heteroscedasticity in
the mean incident values (L = 7.674, p < 0.001). Thus, a Brown-Forsythe test is
used to compare the mean values across locations, but no significant difference is
found (F = 2.049, p = 0.075). Finally, incident frequencies are significantly different
across incident locations (χ2 = 346.75, p < 0.001).
Table 5 displays descriptive statistics for different incident categories. As expected,
there are large differences between the categories. Hence, a more comprehensive
analysis is needed. A Levene test reveals significant heteroscedasticity in the mean
incident values (L = 2.539, p = 0.019). A Brown-Forsythe test reveals that different
incident categories are characterized by significantly different mean incident values
(F = 4.824, p < 0.001). Post-hoc analysis with Tamhane’s T2 reveals that hijacking and
Table 2 Descriptive statistics across months (all values in thousands of EUR)
Month Frequency Total Mean Std. dev.
J 107 28,778 269 572
F 70 39,924 570 1450
M 82 37,033 452 1273
A 74 20,351 275 760
M 73 20,048 275 540
J 65 16,897 260 467
J 62 9984 161 260
A 62 42,909 692 2856
S 68 32,307 475 1746
O 78 19,717 253 564
N 82 19,946 243 332
D 70 33,406 477 759
Total 893 321,301
1 The total values in Tables 4 and 6 differ from those in the other tables. The reason is that a few incidents were
excluded because there was no information available regarding location and/or modus operandi.
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robbery have significantly higher incident values than Btheft from facility,^ Btheft from
vehicle,^ and Blorry theft.^ Finally, incident frequencies are significantly different
across incident categories (χ2 = 944.42, p < 0.001).
Table 6 displays descriptive statistics for different MO. As expected, there are large
differences between the categories. Hence, a more comprehensive analysis is needed. A
Levene test reveals significant heteroscedasticity in the mean incident values
(L = 2.270, p = 0.019). Thus, a Brown-Forsythe test is used to compare the mean
values across MO, but no significant difference is found (F = 2.349, p = 0.075).
Finally, incident frequencies are significantly different across incidentMO (χ2 = 1613.7,
p < 0.001).
Table 7 displays the different product categories which, according to the reports,
have been stolen during violent cargo thefts.
Discussion
The use of violence in cargo theft may be increasing and thus following the general
criminal trend in the EU (cf. EUICS 2005). However, analysis of the TAPA EMEA IIS
data cannot confirm this apparent trend. Violent cargo thefts represent around 5–10% of
all thefts (Table 1 and IRU 2008). There are also seasonal variations in the use of a
Table 3 Descriptive statistics across days of the week (all values in thousands of EUR)
Day of the week Frequency Total Mean Std. dev.
M 142 90,148 635 2185
T 146 29,747 204 316
W 148 62,307 421 1315
T 150 52,072 347 636
F 150 35,659 238 486
S 79 16,058 203 456
S 78 35,311 453 1213
Total 893 321,301
Table 4 Descriptive statistics across locations (all values in thousands of EUR)
Location Frequency Total Mean Std. dev.
Non-secured parking 237 52,234 220 425
Secured parking 13 5850 450 1074
Third party facility 99 37,327 377 667
En route 266 102,547 386 717
Transport mode facility 68 46,391 682 1781
Supply chain facility 158 45,257 286 1236
Total 841 289,607
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violent MO for cargo thefts. The variations are observed for particular months of the
year and days of the week. According to the temperature aggression hypothesis (which
suggests an increase of violent crimes during warmer periods), an increase in violent
cargo crimes during the summer would be expected. However, as Table 2 shows, there
are few significant differences between months. Interestingly, there is only one statis-
tically significant difference (for H2): incident frequency is significantly higher in
January than in June and July. If the mean losses from thefts are reviewed, the picture
changes because four months (February, August, September, and December) show a
higher loss per incident in the value of stolen goods and only July shows a decrease.
With regard to total losses, five months show greater losses (February, March, and
August and slightly fewer total losses in September and December) and only one
month shows a noticeably low total loss, namely July. However, despite these easy-to-
read statistical differences, they are not statistically significant because the sample size
is relatively small (Lantz 2013), which means that with the data used in this paper
cannot either prove or disprove H1. Overall, it is possible to state that the temperature
aggression hypothesis has low validity for understanding violence in cargo thefts.
Nevertheless, the large difference (even if not statistically significant due to the small
sample size) between July and August, in terms of frequency and mean losses, may
indicate that the major reason for differences is not related to temperature variation. At
this stage, we can, of course, only speculate what that systematic reason could be (if
there actually is one), but possible factors might include social habits and practices
Table 5 Descriptive statistics across incident categories (all values in thousands of EUR)
Incident category Frequency Total Mean Std. dev.
Burglary 242 51,121 211 534
Hijacking 212 100,125 472 995
Robbery 381 161,331 423 1528
Theft from facility 3 164 55 49
Theft from vehicle 33 1745 53 68
Theft of vehicle 20 6706 335 651
Lorry Theft 2 109 55 59
Total 893 321,301
Table 6 Descriptive statistics across MO (all values in thousands of EUR)
Modi operandi Frequency Total Mean Std. dev.
Deception 5 3713 743 1354
Deceptive stop 33 19,924 604 1236
Forced stop 43 14,671 341 473
Internal 3 3069 1023 924
Intrusion 242 45,567 188 487
Violent 549 222,868 406 1377
Total 875 309,813
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originating from holidays, fiscal years, institutional factors, and other reasons. These
causes are known to influence retail trade and industrial production and might also
affect the more organized and violent side of cargo crime.
Variation according to the day of the week with regard to violence provides an
interesting picture. Incident frequency is significantly lower on Saturdays and
Sundays than on other days, a finding that supports H4. In addition, Mondays have
a significantly higher incident value than Tuesdays, a finding that supports H3. All
other differences found between the days of the week are not statistically signifi-
cant. Overall, it seems that the use of violence is generally confined to working
days. This statement is based on the finding that only 18% of all thefts occur on
Saturdays and Sundays. A review of mean losses and total losses provides a better
picture because Monday appears as the most dangerous day with higher mean
losses. The dataset used in this research does not indicate why this is the case.
One possible explanation for increased losses on Monday is that is when the theft/
loss is discovered. However, this explanation is not valid because a violent crime
focuses on someone being threatened; therefore, information about time and place
is more accurate than for other reported cargo thefts (cf. Ekwall and Lantz 2013;
Ekwall and Lantz 2015a; Ekwall and Lantz 2015b).
Table 7 Violent cargo thefts and different product categories (all values in thousands of EUR)
Product category Frequency Total Mean Std. dev.
Cash/bullion 17 33,098 1946 4007
Clothing and footwear 32 4093 127 178
Computer software 5 3575 715 1370
Consumer electronics 135 51,516 381 1928
Cosmetic and hygiene products 28 6398 228 466
CPU 28 32,882 1174 1934
Desktop, server, networking 36 6966 193 222
Displays (monitors) 26 4363 167 252
Food and beverage 31 7154 230 402
HDD, storage 3 1769 589 592
Laptops and PDAs 65 14,179 218 418
Memory, RAM 13 6225 478 709
Metal 74 13,704 185 486
Mobile phones 67 48,665 726 954
Non-electronic 79 19,915 252 460
Peripheral (hardware) 15 1245 83 132
Pharmaceutical and medical products 4 6341 1585 2944
Sports goods 6 1743 290 426
Supplies 9 1714 190 106
Tobacco products 86 20,256 235 496
Unspecified 53 7266 137 272
Various IT 79 28,114 355 812
Total 891 321,181
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A review of incident locations, categories, and MO shows many types of significant
difference that were expected from a common sense perspective, even though the
magnitudes were unclear. Interestingly, the most dangerous location is Ben route,^
which represents 35% of total losses and the highest frequency of any single reported
location. Further, locations outside facilities represent 61% of total thefts but only 55%
of total loss value. This suggests that road transportation is vulnerable and therefore
traditional methods of theft, such as non-violent theft, may be used by potential
perpetrators. From an incident and modus operandi perspective, a review shows that
when violence is used in cargo thefts, the mean loss value seems to be significantly
higher, especially when compared to Btheft from facility,^ Btheft from vehicle,^ and
Blorry theft.^ As to incident categories, robbery and hijacking both generate relatively
high frequency (66% of all thefts) but more importantly, higher mean losses (81% of all
loss values) (see Table 5). With regard to modi operandi, the picture is a little different
because from a frequency perspective, violence is involved in 63% of all thefts and
72% of all loss value. A review of the different stolen products shows which types of
companies are members of TAPA EMEA because high value consumer goods are the
most common general product type (see Table 7). It is not possible to make any other
observations based on product type.
Altogether, these general findings about violent cargo theft point towards several
interesting theoretical conclusions. Statistically, it can be stated that perpetrators who
use violence seem to cause greater losses per theft than other types of modus operandi,
particularly Bdeception^ and Binternal.^ It could be concluded that perpetrators respond
to greater security with more violence, and by so doing, they need to steal goods of
greater value because violence draws greater attention from the authorities. In addition,
if convicted, the perpetrators can expect longer prison sentences. The most common
type of violent cargo theft occurs on Mondays in January and involves robbing a lorry
on the road and stealing consumer electronics.
The analysis of the TAPA EMEA IIS statistics regarding violent cargo thefts
confirms the presence of seasonality and reveals different seasonal patterns across
categories on yearly and weekly bases. Surprisingly, the main criminology theory for
explaining seasonality with regard to violent crimes, the temperature aggression hy-
pothesis, finds little support in this research. Nevertheless, the reasons behind season-
ality on both a yearly and weekly basis may be found in either the seasonality of cargo
transportation (volume, types of product, routes, storage decisions, etc.) or in the
seasonality of perpetrators’ willingness to commit these types of crime. Because there
is no significant decrease in the number of thefts in any given month, but there is a
decrease on Saturdays and Sundays (H4), this could be interpreted as the potential
perpetrators preferring to Bwork^ during the week and do other things during the
weekends. This is just speculation, and with the data set forth in this paper, the
statement cannot be confirmed or rejected.
From an SCD perspective, any type of cargo theft is interesting as it removes goods
from the legal SC and sells the products to the, hopefully intended, end consumers. The
illegal/stolen products make their way back to legal SCs, normally through flea
markets, pawnshops, jewellers, websites, or second-hand stores, depending on who
the sellers are (Johns and Hayes 2003). By doing this, the SC is hit twice as it first loses
its products and later it also loses sales. It is possible to attribute the loss of market
shares and sales to the poor protection of the products in the SC. The loss of goods due
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to violent MO only means larger losses, at any given incident, than other types of cargo
thefts.
Conclusion
According to the TAPA EMEA IIS statistics, the number of cargo theft incidents that
involve violence is relatively low, around 5% of total thefts. This should be compared
with other sources, which claim that up to 10% of all cargo thefts involve violence
(IRU 2008). The IRU (2008) study also concludes that 17% of lorry drivers have been
robbed in the last five years, 30% more than once, and 21% have been physically
assaulted (IRU 2008). Despite this, the data set forth in this paper suggests that the use
of violence is still relatively rare. From an impact perspective, a violent MO generates
higher direct losses per theft than most other types of MO. With regard to the total risk
in relation to cargo theft, it seems that the road transportation industry should be
concerned about violence because such an MO always generates higher direct losses
and can also cause higher indirect costs, such as treatment for exposed personnel. The
higher direct losses also lead to a higher likelihood for SCD as more products are lost at
one particular event. This suggests that the risk for theft of certain products (see
Table 7) also should be taken into account when a company is considering ways to
reduce the general risk for SCD. Furthermore, the result in this paper shows that
different transport chain locations have different likelihoods for violent cargo thefts,
which means that the distribution chain needs to be considered in order to reduce the
general risk of SCD. These results are consistent with previous research (Ekwall and
Lantz 2016).
The seasonal effect on violent cargo crimes seems to be small, even if the data used
in this paper supports three of the four hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4). However, within
this understanding, there are only a few statistically significant differences found in the
TAPA EMEA IIS data as to violence. The differences in the mean values of thefts
across MO and incident types could indicate that crime often reflects the perpetrator’s
assessment of the crime’s risk, the required effort, the potential payoff, the degree of
peer support for the action, the risk of apprehension and punishment, and individual
needs (Reppetto 1974; Clarke 1995). Generally, incident types such as hijacking and
robbery (or Bforced stop^ and Bviolent^) receive greater attention from the authorities,
carry higher conviction risks, and lead to more severe punishments. The profit from a
theft (the mean value of the stolen cargo) must be sufficiently high to cover the crime
risk or cost as assessed by the perpetrator. Similar reasoning applies to incident
categories such as deception and internal because they both require greater planning
and execution abilities as indicated by the higher mean losses per incident.
Implications for research
As demonstrated in this paper, crime against the flow of goods is a real threat and must
be considered in SCRM research. The, normally external (see Table 6), source of
uncertainty of cargo crime, which can cause supply chain disruptions, needs to be
included in future research. The two examples presented in the introduction of this
paper illustrate a need to include cargo theft and the use of violence in SCRM research.
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The example of supply chain disruption caused by a violent modus operandi in cargo
thefts means that the indirect costs related to any incident of theft clearly have the
potential to surpass the direct costs many times over. In normal terms of strategies
against SCD (safety buffers in time, capacity, and inventory), cargo theft removes
goods (lowers available inventory), which may lead to a need for increased capacity,
and if the goods are stolen at the wrong places, there is no time left to distribute the
goods. Further, both examples given in this paper provided a direct link between a
cargo theft incident and the insurance service provider. Therefore, analyzing this type of
problem in a supply chain context should include integrated service providers (ISPs), as
well as LSPs, because the former are directly involved with other parties. This would
lead to a discussion about liability because the parties would try to share (or refuse) the
costs of theft with other parties (cf. Ekwall and Nilsson 2008).
We can only speculate about the reasons for the seasonality of violent cargo thefts.
Possible reasons for this phenomenon include variations in the type of goods, of-
fenders, transport volumes, and/or the number of offenders. The reason for such
seasonality should be addressed in future research using other data sources. This paper
also highlights the need for an interdisciplinary approach in order to understand the
effects of crime from a risk perspective.
Implications for practitioners
The knowledge that perpetrators may specialize in a certain method of theft in order to
maximize their results could aid the development of managerial approaches to security.
According to various businesses, the incidence of thefts increases during the
BChristmas rush^ period; that is, the period just before Christmas. However, our results
do not support this observation. We suggest that there is a post-Christmas rush increase
in the number of thefts and a similar increase in late summer (August). Businesses also
assert that thefts increase on weekends; however, this observation is also unsupported
by our results, although other sources indicate that there are more thefts on weekends
(FreightWatch 2012; Burges 2013). As violent cargo theft can be considered an external
SCD, the internal managerial decision-making process must consider cargo theft when
developing preventive measures (cf. Lorentz and Hilmola 2012). In other words,
involved organizations need to consider the risk for cargo theft in order to apply the
right security at the right transport chain location for the riskiest products and should
also consider parallel distribution channels in order to avoid SCD impacts after a major
cargo theft incident.
The latter issue needs more attention from researchers and logistics companies.
The results of this paper support the conclusions of prior studies (Ekwall 2009;
Ekwall 2010; Ekwall and Lantz 2013) in that perpetrators (specifically, their
actions and decision triggers) need to be included in the analysis of cargo theft
(cf. Guthrie and Guthrie 2006). This is a straightforward conclusion; however, the
current trend in SCRM research is to exclude criminal threats other than terrorism
to supply chains (Sheffi 2001; Christopher and Lee 2004; Khan and Burnes 2007;
Rao and Goldsby 2009; Lorentz and Hilmola 2012; Ghadge et al. 2013; Lee and
Rha 2016).
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